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Abstract: 
Purpose – What seems like a new social anthropology of global regulation is an endeavour much too grand for 
this paper, even though it has much merit. To contain the analysis which follows, the discussion of social 
embeddedness will be restricted to a comparison of markets which retain some local or regional integrity from 
those which have become largely removed from cultural or communal social bonds. An example is between 
markets trading in goods and services with a consumer base which is local and subsistence, and markets in 
derivative products that are inextricably dependent on supranational location. The paper aims to discuss these 
issues. 
Design/methodology/approach – North World regulatory principle operates within consolidated state frameworks, 
dislocated market societies and reflects socially disembedded productivity relationships. The same could be said 
for dominant economic regulatory scholarship. More recent efforts to develop critical analysis of South World 
regulatory problems and answers have consistently remained connected to the referent of the regulatory state. This 
paper questions the utility of such a comparative conviction in a global governance reality wherein South World 
regulatory environments are largely subject to North World state interests and multi-national opportunism 
fostered by disaggregated, often dysfunctional, domestic states. 
Findings – If, as in many South World contexts, the state is dysfunctional or destructive in translating regulatory 
principle, then what are the social bonds which advance the integrity of regulatory principle, and what of 
externalities which work to draw culturally located principle towards a more hegemonic regulatory project? Could 
appreciating the relationship between regulatory principle and social bonding be exhibited in degrees of market 
embeddedness? Might the reimagining of regulatory principle be possible by reflecting on motives and outcomes 
for regulation that have other than wealth maximization as core value? The paper answers these conjectures as a 
basis for empirical research. 
Research limitations/implications – In the spirit of regulatory anthropology it is not helpful to remain immersed in 
some strained geographic regulatory dichotomy, employing some good state/bad state polarity. Neither World 
exists in regulatory isolation. International regulatory organizations ensure this through their Western/Northern 
development models, and perpetuate post-colonial influences over South World development agendas. That said, 
there are two regulatory worlds, and hybrids between. Despite this, regulatory principle is not immune from 
cultural forces and social bonding. The paper addresses various dualities in order to propose a new way of 
viewing South World regulatory paradigms. 
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Practical implications – The framework for analysis will enable a repositioning of critical scholarship and 
regulatory policy away from the model frameworks of consolidated states and towards the real regulatory needs 
and potentials of the South World. 
Social implications – Through applying the analytical technique of social embeddedness above market 
community paradigms this analysis offers a novel approach to exploring economy in contexts where markets are 
not dislocated and products are not fictitious. In this way the contemporary materialist economic crisis can be 
viewed against principles of sustainability rather than growth, productivity and exchange. 
Originality/value – The paper draws upon established scholarship regarding market embeddedness and social 
bonding but unique in applying this to a South World void of regulatory discourse set free of comparison with 
inappropriate regulatory state referents. 
 
Keywords: Development, Governance, Culture, Economic philosophy/theory, Global political economy, Social 
goods 
 
Introduction 
Regulation and economy are inextricable. There is nothing new in either the suggestion that contemporary 
regulation policy (local, regional or global) is disproportionately motivated by economic considerations 
(Llewellyn, 1999), or that individual profit-driven economics as a central regulatory objective may have had its 
day (Shutt, 2010). Regulating economy is no longer confined to concerns of economic governance alone. It is also 
largely accepted that globalized risk priorities such as the war on terror have seen the use of economically directed 
regulatory devices (such as financial transaction reporting) employed for purposes additional to their original 
economic remit (Munshani, 2010). By extending economic regulation into fields outside economy, covering other 
essential aspirations of human comfort such as collective human security and universalizing individual integrity, 
we have exposed economic regulation to evaluation well beyond the measure of wealth creation. Even when the 
essential economic motivation behind regulation is blatantly apparent, arguments against regulation focus on the 
failings of financial regulation in particular to achieve its economic intentions (Wallison, 2009). Maybe one of the 
problems with the determination of regulation's influence on economy (or its distance from it) has been the 
emphasis on cash above conscience[1]. 
As we elaborate later, looking at cultural relativity, and specifically global economic divisions in any model 
sense, has its dangers. Can a culturally/socially relative analysis of regulation produce realistic reflections for 
regulatory theory or policy when at a regional and global level socio-economic development is currently 
constrained within one prevailing theoretical model (both economic and regulatory)? The paper suggests that 
possibilities now exist, with this dominant paradigm challenged and weakened in influence, for fundamental 
transformations in regulatory principle to be understood through a socio-culturally relative analysis which rejects 
as an obligatory, critical referent a North/West World construction of the consolidated state, otherwise against 
which regulatory developments must be compared and measured[2]. 
What seems like a new social anthropology of global regulation is an endeavour much too grand for this paper, 
even though it has much merit. To contain the analysis which follows, the discussion of social embeddedness will 
be restricted to a comparison of markets which retain some local or regional integrity from those which have 
become largely removed from cultural or communal social bonds. An example is between markets trading in 
goods and services with a consumer base which is local and subsistence, and markets in derivative products that 
are inextricably dependent on supranational location[3]. 
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Contexts for the analysis 
Like Granovetter (1985), we are also here focusing on the embeddedness of economic behaviour, because of an 
anthropological interest in transitions from premarket societies, to the more autonomous market relations of 
modernized societies. Associated with this transition is a growth in regulation which supports progressively less 
embedded market conditions and outcomes which have culminated in post-Fordist capitalist market and product 
abstraction. In terms of social bonding this transition is evidenced by the separation of economy from other 
frames of social relations, and the development of markets no longer reliant on organic bonding such as kinship 
and obligation. Under these conditions, the motivations for the market are aligned with individual gain and the 
regulatory outcomes are no longer livelihoods submerged in social relations. 
Whether one challenges either the level of embeddedness in pre-market societies or the degree and rate of change 
along with modernization, as the recent near collapse of the global financial market indicates, radical dislocation 
of product and production from any social location (which has been the case with fictitious financial 
commodification and associated marketing) has relegated the value of embeddedness in the sphere of North 
World regulation to little more than some normative ideal. In contrast, social embeddedness is a positive indicator 
of regulatory bonding, aligned with the fundamental principles of the particular social unit. For example Fordian 
capitalism regulated the industrial workforce with the appearance of a welfare orientation, but was in reality more 
driven by principles in keeping with the protestant ethic and the commitment to make the market work better for 
capital (Morvaridi, 2012). 
Regional and global regulatory crises are enunciated from a Western/Northern focus. The subject of regulation 
policy and commentary itself is a Western conceptualization (or at least viewed from an irredentist perspective) 
and many of the theories and techniques discussed in regulatory scholarship are building blocks to a theoretical, 
state-referential model assumed to be superior to, or at least dominant over, those of other cultures and societies. 
 
Mechanics of embeddedness – how “solid” is solidarity 
Turning away from solidarity which holds society together, to reflect on the types of solidarity in social relations 
– communal and associative (Weber, 1978, Chapter 1) – in post-Fordist economies, it is apparent that social 
relationships moulded through the division of labour are no longer universally built on coordinated interests (if 
they ever were). Associative labour relationships are now more likely to be externally forced/and mechanically 
imposed. Times have changed and where we diverge from Durkheim's treatment of the mechanical/organic 
dialectic is initially by questioning the contemporary relevance of his version of the division of labour as “the 
supreme law of human societies and the condition of their progress” (Durkheim, 1893, p. 39). Weber would doubt 
as an idealized interpretation of the forces behind such a division, and favour Durkheim's interpretation that 
mechanical solidarity constructed through law may be imposed devices to control social behaviours and 
relationships which “offend(s) strong and defined states of the collective conscience” (Durkheim, 1893, p. 39). 
Indeed in post-Fordist capitalist economies, we would argue that as a result of the unnatural nature of labour 
division (and more importantly disembedded market arrangements which sustain and are sustained by its 
artificiality), mechanical rather than organic solidarity prevails due to the recurrent failure of Durkheim's belief in 
the resilience of meritocracy. A complex division of labour as he saw it meant that people were allocated in 
society according to merit; therefore moral regulation and economic regulation are needed to maintain order, for 
people to “compose their differences peaceably” (Durkheim, 1893, p. 60). Contrary to this view, in a global 
setting, the violence entailed in maintaining the post-colonial North/South economic divide suggests that 
discriminatory economic ordering requires mechanical enforcement if the oppression of discriminatory peace is to 
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be maintained. Merit is not an organic discriminator where labour prices are depressed, skill retarded and 
opportunity constrained in the South for the economic benefit of the North. Poverty-based discrimination between 
the world divide questions the real market reasons behind socio-economic developmental failures of South World 
countries, so often used to justify colonialism. The provident North image suggests that only the systematic 
adoption of the values, practices and resources of modernization can overcome the absence of social capital to 
establish the necessary preconditions for greater material prosperity in the South (Woolcock, 1998, p. 153). This 
places a large amount of the focus on nation states and transnational corporations, and rational individuals and 
firms, to lead the South to economic prosperity, while overlooking the vital role of domestic civil society and 
other institutional arrangements, appropriately resourced and regulated, that can and should mediate the space 
between states and markets. In this regard pressures for autonomy (commercial in particular) which feature in 
North World development models devalue the significance of economic embeddedness[4], in favour of atomized 
markets and autonomous productivity paradigms, mechanically maintained. 
We argue that it is this economic and regulatory myopia which ignores the significance of socially embedded 
economic relations for a South World development model which can avoid the exacerbation of discriminatory 
mechanical ordering which underpins the North World development dominion. In order to add detail to this 
revision we engage Granovetter's two concepts of embeddedness and autonomy (Granovetter, 1985, p. 493). In 
his argument, all economic action is inherently enmeshed in social relations of one configuration or another, and 
development brought about a change in the kind, not degree of embeddedness. Three claims of this embeddedness 
thesis require: 
(1) all forms of exchange are inherently embedded in social relationships; 
(2) embeddedness itself can take several distinct forms – e.g. social ties, cultural practices and political 
contexts; and 
(3) embeddedness within a network can bring benefits as well as costs. 
Woolcock (1998) is interested in the consideration of embeddedness and autonomy at the micro and macro level: 
manifest through intra-community ties (embeddedness, micro), state-society relations (embeddedness, macro), 
extra community networks (autonomy, micro) and institutional capacity and credibility (autonomy, macro). He 
employs four terms to explore social capital in these forms: integration (intra-community ties), linkage (extra-
community networks), synergy (state-society relations) and organizational integrity (institutional capacity and 
credibility) (Woolcock, 1998). These categories are not inconsistent with Polanyi's interest in market exchange, 
redistribution and reciprocity, which we later employ. Examining the relationship between embeddedness and the 
forces behind regulatory bonding in different cultural settings, these four indicia with their emphasis on 
community positioning, state relativity and institutionalization can assist to distinguish how different cultural 
environments may exhibit particular principles towards embeddedness which can have a powerful influence over 
the nature and style of regulatory bonding. For our analysis, their emphasis on macro state embeddedness would 
be a backdrop to a more subjective evaluation of what makes up for state disaggregation. Where Woolcock's 
classification is compatible with other interesting approaches to understanding the economic resonance of social 
embeddedness is through its fundamental distinction of autonomy, such a feature of North World economic 
models. 
Uphoff (1996) argues that both top-down efforts and bottom-up development must occur in a positive-sum way, 
when appreciating the importance of social embeddedness (Uphoff, 1996, p. 273). Therefore, social relations 
which connect top-down resources and bottom-up capacity building must be forged if economy is to complement 
social capital in different cultures. For sustainable economic development, the interaction between top-down and 
bottom-up must be a dynamic one. These observations emphasize the utility of a sociological perspective on 
economic development which not only looks at resource flows and capacity building in economic measure, but 
positions these within specific cultural experiences and relationships. 
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According to Woolcock, when we look at bottom-up development (micro level), intensive intra-community 
integration must be accompanied by linkages that transcend the community, so that: 
(1) the economic and non-economic claims of community members can be resisted when they undermine the 
group's economic viability and expansion; 
(2) entry to more sophisticated factor and product markets can be secured; and 
(3) individuals of superior ability and ambition within the business group can insert themselves into larger 
and more complex social networks. 
The latter point is crucial in understanding the dual analytical presence of embeddedness: a component within a 
system, and that system within a social world. Woolcock was writing from a consolidated state perspective. For 
top-down development (macro level), independent groups in civil society must be included in the state's shaping 
of government policies and performance. State-society relations in development such as the combinations of the 
state's organizational capacity and its engagement and responsiveness to civil society are needed for countries to 
be developmental. In these processes embedded autonomy may be viewed as “a concrete set of social ties which 
bind the state to society and provide institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of 
goals and policies” (Evans, 1992, p. 164). Essential for this analysis is a functioning state as a source for 
regulatory sponsorship and initiative. In social frames where such is not the case then the challenge is for civil 
society and other bonding processes and institutions to provide the conditions where otherwise state 
responsibilities would be embedded. This is neither strained nor indeed impossible in so many societies and 
cultures where the state has never played a critical or dominant regulatory function. In these settings the pre-
existing social bonds need activation and enlivening rather than replacement with fragile and unsustainable state 
function which too often has been the direction of North to South regulatory capacity building. 
To a certain extent, as artificial and state-reliant as the bio-directional analysis may seem, bottom-up and top-
down might be interpreted as metaphors for the dynamics of North to South World regulatory influence (top 
down) and the emergent (and we suspect more organic and embedded) local regulatory dynamics in South World 
societies. 
 
Redirecting analytical focus 
When talking specifically in terms of the regulatory state (and we suggest it holds as well for regulatory discourse 
at large), Dubash and Morgan (2012) have recently observed: 
With the exception of a small but growing body of work on Latin America, most work on the regulatory state 
deals with the US or Europe, or takes a relatively undifferentiated “legal transplant” approach to the developed 
world (Dubash and Morgan, 2012, p. 261). 
Such a diffusion Kayaalp (2012) approach seldom achieves its desired outcome of global institutional 
homogeneity, even with the existing global pervasiveness of regulatory models, because of the differences 
between that adopted global policy and the generated practice on the ground. When a transplant of the global 
model is adopted, it undergoes a process of translation and gains a different meaning from those inherent in that 
original model. Furthermore, given that regulation is a result of the involvement and interaction of a variety of 
different actors that necessarily differ in their negotiations, conflicts and resistance across cultures, regulation as a 
multidimensional process cannot simply be transplanted as a framework of predetermined duties and 
responsibilities which neglects the regulatory process that takes place thereafter. For example, the de facto 
operation of independent regulatory agencies in Turkey, sharply diverge from their de jure constellations, and 
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weak institutions were merely reshaped through the implementation of reforms and the transplantation of global 
models (Özel, 2012). 
It would be over-simplified, however, to distinguish the South World regulatory character, again in terms of state 
comparison and in its case dysfunctional or disaggregated state regulatory capacity. Defining the South World in 
terms of shared histories of countries rather than the delimitations of political geography or state functionality, 
enables the acknowledgement of diversity within that World (Dubash and Morgan, 2012, p. 261), particularly in 
terms of its engagement with globalization (Findlay, 1999). Also, considering the different lived histories of 
cultures and peoples rather than only their stages of economic modernization or their geo-political value, breaks 
the comparison free from North-centric temporal and spatial determinants which may end to justify rather than 
explain the current analytical focus of global regulation. 
As is revealed in some of the examples of transitional South World regulatory states (expanded on in the section 
to follow), there can exist a positive state somewhere between the consolidated Northern style, and the 
disaggregated states which feature in the South. The positive state is characterized by active and effective 
integration between civil society and at least one arm of the state (such as the judiciary) so as to make possible a 
representative coalition enabling at list something of the state to facilitate domestically relevant regulatory 
intervention. The positive state seems to be a necessary feature of transitional South World regulation wherein the 
state referent remains valuable but distinct from the North World state centering/decentering alternatives. 
In addition to recognizing these state distinctions there are two responsibilities on those who seek to reposition 
regulatory analysis to correct an apparent North state-centered substantive bias, or at least to declare it. The first is 
to establish why repositioning would address the bias, and then to indicate how repositioning is to be achieved. 
Alternative to this debate, there are other ways of doing regulation which reside in the South World, and 
interrogating these more than in terms of state reflection but rather as to their principles and regulatory motives 
and outcomes, would add value to the regulation of global crisis, if revealed and analysed because of their organic 
forms and their tendency towards social embeddedness. It is anticipated that by focusing on different principles 
for regulation (which are likely not to depend on the state), then interrogating other regulatory motivations for 
social bonding (not driven by the state) complementary regulatory outcomes (outside state intervention) which 
satisfy wider social frames beside economy, will be revealed[5]. 
An analysis that focuses on non-state mechanisms of regulation is enhanced beyond the Northern, de-centered 
state regulation debate (Morgan and Yeung, 2007) when we look at the influence or absence South World 
disaggregated states, not as a referent but as a regulatory diversion or impediment. These cultures with faint 
institutional regulatory shadows (discussed in Findlay, 2013, Chapter 1) are often described as weak states 
because state actors do not command sufficient and broad-based authority or the legitimacy of state policies is 
recurrently called into question. What exists of the state (specifically in its governance domain) lacks the requisite 
capacity to regulate in some of the most fundamental fields taken for granted in Northern/Western governance 
frames, and in a market sense in particular, is unable to withstand political and social challenges from non-state 
actors, particularly those with better developed and more resilient governance frames and linkages to consolidated 
external state authorities. By unpacking the weak state (or indeed the non- or anti-state), through focusing on the 
social bonds of internal and external non-state actors (in civil society and commercial market contexts largely 
ungoverned by the state), there is the potential to reveal pre, or non-state regulatory landscapes. More than this, to 
compare where the provident state offers regulatory capacity and to examine what substitutes for it or replaces it 
in the South World may be a more revealing way to employ state referents. 
Where regulation is less than comprehensive or where lacunae exist and particular areas of social interaction 
remain unregulated, such settings are often described as fragmented regulatory space, and this is so particularly in 
the South World contexts. In the literature, when the narrow regulatory standards applicable to Western/North 
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World scholars are unthinkingly applied to South World regulatory derivations, and conditions which allow for 
non-state action to predominate are determined as wanting, too often this occurs minus further consideration of 
explanations outside of vague notions of cultural relativity. The phenomenon of non-state actors taking the rein in 
regulatory affairs is reflective of a deeper and more intricate management of exchange networks that is socially 
located in wider interactive social frames, which may and indeed should prove to be more desirable for organic 
and principled regulation not burdened by politicized state interests. 
The analysis of regulation without the consolidated state referent, we suggest, offers a more fruitful opportunity 
not only to appreciate the dynamics of regulation in localized South World situations. In addition, this analysis 
should provide the possibility for understanding local, regional and global crises identified within a South World 
perspective. For example, reflect on corruption and the bonds of exploitation which corrupt political and 
commercial relationships exert over South World development agendas. Politicians are not only compromised 
through the exploitation by commercial externalities, of their own self-interest, but particular social bonding 
framed within a limited election cycle create real dilemmas facing elected officials when approaching the question 
of regulatory reform, with anti-corruption at the fore. Elected officials in such situations have a disincentive to 
push for regulatory reforms in short-term. The need to cede control over their respective realms of authority 
means that elected politicians may actually decline to vote in favour of such changes, or overcome the dilemma 
by subjecting the regulatory agencies to patronage through other means. The entry of local civil society non-state 
actors (not driven alone by sectarian interests) into the regulatory landscape, in these political and commercial 
bonds, has the capacity to safeguard against possibilities of corruption as they serve as a check and balance 
countervailing regulatory force. The difficulty with this state-replacement analysis, however, is that even in the 
most disaggregated states, externalities such as bribes from multinational commercial interest, can also infect 
segments of civil society and subject these to the same negative bonds which corrupt politicians advance 
(Newton, 2001, p. 210). 
Understanding the complexity of contested social bonding in South World settings where governance is strained 
between disaggregated state institutions and processes, and sectarian and divided civil society bonding cannot be 
achieved from an external analytical standpoint. From an empirical scholar's perspective a way forward is to seek 
out and broadcast regulatory and culturally defining literature from the South World about the South World. 
Unfortunately literature which might claim any such heritage is extremely limited and largely confined to the 
commentary of external scholars on the regulatory state, or local commentators reflecting on adaptations of North 
World regulatory (and state-referential) experiments (for instance, see the content of the Special Issue, 2012). 
 
Is Turkey the pin-up boy? Utility of regulatory intersection 
Much of the literature discussing South World states tracks the transition towards a regulatory state with the 
implementation of regulatory reforms and transplants adapted from the North (Amann and Baer, 2005). Sectoral 
analyses are often undertaken with respect to these states (e.g. Hsueh, 2012; Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2005), yet 
they remain caught within the narrow confines of the regulatory models set up by the North. Particularly when 
foreign direct investment is the focus and motivation for regulatory reform, the dialectic circles infrastructural 
initiatives undertaken by the government to build a private sector (Kirkpatrick et al., 2006), and this distinction 
between state and private actors is often perpetuated such that the regulatory endeavours undertaken often simply 
address only the relation between the state and such private actors, neglecting the sophisticated networks of 
exchange existing as between such private actors that have impact of the operation of regulation in that limited 
sense. 
We were recently asked the question as to why Turkey, Columbia, Brazil and India seemed to be the now states of 
the South when the literature is searching to understand the regulatory state outside the North World. Besides a 
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flippant response that this is where researchers might want to take their holidays, or chance meetings with local 
researchers at conferences, there may be more credible reasons for this phenomenon. 
Transition between the North and South World states may be founded on the benefit of economic union (as for 
Turkey), or the favoured nation status (from the USA to Brazil and Columbia), or the robust emergence from 
centralized to tiger economies (in India's case). The utility of these case studies, we argue, rests somewhere in 
their transitional stages between social embeddedness and globalized dislocation, without totally sacrifice wider 
social bonding frameworks. This transition, particularly in the case of Turkey and India, can be trans-positioned 
against the retention of resilient and recurrent principled social bonding unique to culture. 
That said, we anticipate that the analytical utility of these “transitional states” may be more limited than it would 
first appear. The reason lies in the reality that all the case study nation states in this block (even including the new 
Columbia) either retain strong and consolidated state frameworks, or are through geo-political significance, the 
recipients of interest and influence from very strong neighbour states. The state, therefore, comfortably remains 
the regulatory referent and the literature confirms this. Even when a sub-national state analysis is adopted, to 
suggest that the national framework may be challenged through a disaggregation of the state, the state is 
continuously referred to as the creator of central rules, and regional sub-states are analyzed vis-à-vis the central 
state (Sinha, 2003). 
Another reason we suggest that the transitional state context may not advance or refute our search for the 
connection between principle, organic regulatory form and social embeddedness as a progression to reveal the 
merit in repositioning principled regulation, resides in the nature of their economies. These transitional states are 
on their way to, or have significantly attained the North economic paradigm. As such it is in their interest to 
immerse themselves in North World regulatory thinking and practice. It would be fair to suspect, therefore, that 
the motivations and outcomes of regulation in these case studies have come to reflect North World practice, and 
local adaptations are viewed as nothing more. 
For these states to retain a transitional status, fractures within the state frame will prevent any entirely compatible 
reflection on regulation's relationship with a consolidated state. For example, it is not impossible to perceive of 
governance situations in such transitional states where the government is corrupt, weak or compromised and the 
executive or the judiciary retain some regulatory legitimacy and potential. Recent South World (transitional state) 
regulatory research focus is concerned with the extent to which the judicial discretion can activate even weak 
legislative frameworks, and produce accountable and more effective regulatory projects. Judicial activism, for 
instance, enables the judiciary to play a pivotal role in otherwise contested regulatory affairs, and this can occur at 
various stages of the regulatory exercise such as the initial stages of pushing for the setting up of an independent 
regulatory authority[6], so that courts may actually become the instigator for particular regulatory models. This 
was the case in India when the Indian Supreme Court paved the way for the liberalization of its 
telecommunication industry (Thiruvengadam and Joshi, 2012, pp. 334-335). More than this, the Indian judiciary 
legitimated the regulator and its jurisdiction to make policy decisions (Thiruvengadam and Joshi, 2012, p. 333). 
The judiciary, through its decisions, can place not inconsiderable pressure on regulatory agencies to adopt certain 
regulatory mechanisms. This is especially so if the regulatory dialogue at the court level was technocratic in 
nature (Urueña, 2012). In the case of Colombia, the mix of actors in its regulatory landscape has led it to be 
described as a constitutional variant of the regulatory state, because of its judiciary playing an active counter-
majoritarian role by pushing for constitutional protection for basic civil rights (Urueña, 2012, pp. 288-289). A 
state considered as such means that the redistribution exercise usually undertaken by regulatory agencies which 
are independent from the state is now subsumed under the domain of a central state institutional entity, in this 
case the judiciary, which has representational links to the citizens of the state. 
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While current regulatory literature sees the traditional regulatory state as one with increased delegation of 
governmental power to regulatory agencies (Oliver et al., 2010, Chapter 2) – that is, the extension of rule-making, 
monitoring and enforcement tasks via bureaucratic organs of the state (Levi-Faur, 2011, p. 14) – the trend among 
transitional South World states seems to be a reversion to Majone's (1997) positive state (Majone, 1997). The 
facilitation of more and better public involvement in lawmaking areas whether through the judiciary or collective 
action undertaken by civil society (discussed below) locates regulatory principle in the hands of society, thereby 
enhancing the organic character of such regulation, which means that it is more socially embedded. 
Quite apart from the judiciary, civil society groups add to the mix of forces at work in the regulatory process 
where the state shadow is faint. Civil society capacity can range from technical expertise to correct or make up for 
state weakness or omission, down to the provision of critical public interest accountability. State officials and 
regulators in these circumstances are strengthened in legitimacy and capacity through harnessing the connections 
that such civil society constellations have to large constituency bases as a means for collecting, disseminating and 
accessing regulatory information and dialogue (Hochstetler, 2012). The extent of civil society participation in 
South World states can sometimes reach a point of co-option of the regulatory process and thereby the regulatory 
agenda is clearly set by non-state actors. This was so in the Philippines when regulatory mobilization (Chng, 
2012) in the form of collective action taken by community organizations and private vendors resulted in locally 
legitimate norms and networks to operate outside the formal regulatory framework. 
In some transitional settings the public/private, state/civil society demarcation is far from clear and this can be a 
consequence of the structure of the state and its relationships with civil society, in situations where the private 
sphere is increasing in significance, while the state remains pervasive. As in the case of China, because of the 
strong nationalist sentiments that persisted since the early 1900s, the state has been playing a dominant role in 
both regulatory affairs as well as in the private markets. The situation has been described as one where 
“government power is married to the profits of the firms” (Lu, 2000, p. 280) in that government agencies set up 
official firms which sell consulting services regarding regulatory decisions such that there is a conflict of interest 
given that these firms were subsidiaries of the agencies whose decisions were sought. In this example, what has 
taken place is an institutionalization of corruption through the state's increasingly entrepreneurial role in the very 
sectors that it regulates. As a result, any simple transplantation of the prevailing global regulatory model that sees 
liberalization and the delegation of regulatory authority to independent agencies, will not succeed. Furthermore, 
the pervasiveness of organizational corruption encourages deviant actions by government agencies such that they 
behave like principals pursuing their own interests that are not necessarily in congruence with those of the state 
(Lu, 2000). 
Within the state/private regulatory intersection, fundamental dysfunctions can erode clarity in regulatory 
principle. A culture of corruption could be so prevalent such to be accepted into society as part of the regulatory 
environment as in the case of China, where state actions are categorized into those which the state has designed to 
be perceived as regulatory inevitable (such as guan xi), and those that are kept concealed but not escaping the 
understanding and experience of civil society. Particularly when media outlets are co-opted by the state, it 
becomes more and more difficult to draw parallels between the regulatory design and practical regulatory 
outcome, if the state and its media have a vested interest in making what the state sets out to regulate look like a 
natural consequence of regulatory activity (Figure 1 (2009) Figure 2, p. 27). 
Also, where the subsisting regulatory arrangement that has become entrenched is one where informal 
relationships predominantly provide security for state and private malfeasance, and formal institutional 
frameworks are altogether absent or complicit in the regulatory challenge, society has adapted by engaging other 
strategies including risk management and uncertainty management to confront the perverted excesses of state 
regulation. In such situations, the legitimacy and therefore value accorded to actions of the state becomes so 
undermined it results in rejection or boycott of state regulatory initiatives, as a consequence of epidemic distrust. 
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The comparative approach – liberating embedded principle 
The comparative approach means that understanding other societies implies a consciousness of our own 
culturally bounded conceptions. In other words, to compare is to ponder simultaneously over the unity of 
mankind and its obvious diversity (Berthoud, 1990, p. 172). 
In addition to the utility of South/North comparison directed to social embeddeness rather than regulatory state 
modelling, we advance the importance of comparison within cultural locations. Internal comparison enables 
different locations of motivation and outcome to be understood as influencing preferred principle in various 
contexts of social bonding. Polanyi assists us here. Within market patterns individuals and groups can be moved 
by material motives or by ideal motives. The first is dependent initially on everyday needs and then can develop 
into wealth as a motivator and an outcome when subsistence is transformed into surplus. The second notion is 
linked with actions and values like solidarity, honour, pride, moral duty or civic obligation, or even to face 
(Polanyi, 1968, p. 69). 
Social bonding, we suggest, is not just the outcome of particular regulatory motivations. In fact, social bonding 
influences and is influenced by various principles such as: 
 utilitarianism; 
 atomism; 
 individualism; 
 naturalism; and 
 evolutionism. 
These different bonding contexts in turn convey critical meanings for market mentality. Take for instance the 
economic rationalism which underpins utilitarian bonding, reducing individual and collective motivation and 
outcomes to means/ends corollaries. In a contemporary, modernized economic context rationalism principles are 
further reduced to favouring material ends. Polanyi (1977) is not willing to constrain a utilitarian value scale in 
purely materialist terms, and spoke of “the erroneous conception of unlimited human wants and needs” and the 
“false notion of the good life as a utilitarian culmination of human pleasures” (Polanyi, 1977, pp. xlvi and 13). 
The modern economic wealth/pleasure/utility principle set rests on a vision of modernist materialist values as 
rational, and traditional values as pre-logical, superstitious and obscurantist. Hannah Arendt (1988) in her book 
The Human Condition reveals the deep ethnocentric prejudice exhibited in this approach to rationalism: 
[…] among other principal characteristics of the modern time […] we find the typical attitudes of homo 
faber: the instumentalisation of the world […] the faith in the universal bearing of the means-ends 
category, the conviction that all problems can be solved, and all human motivations can be reduced to the 
principle of utility. 
Polanyi suggests an alternative approach to economic determinism individually driven, and economic rationalism 
wealth focused. For Polanyi the capitalist market mentality was even at the middle of the last century, obsolete. 
To escape this mentality would require a reform of human consciousness. But this should not be unthinkable, as it 
was what happened when the industrial revolution produced “such a forced conversion to a utilitarian outlook 
(that) fatefully warped Western mans’ understanding of himself” (Polanyi, 1968, p. 63). 
Polanyi turned to history and anthropology to test the contemporary universal truth of market mentality. In so 
doing he was neither searching for paradise lost, nor preferring a romanticist anti-market mentality. He refused to 
reduce man to a utilitarian atom, and rejected methodological individualism which is the heart of contemporary 
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economic analysis. Polanyi preferred to advance the crucial role of values in understanding societies, preferring a 
holistic approach to appreciate the function and meaning of any specific phenomenon within its social and 
cultural whole. In seeing the study of economy as just part of that whole Polanyi invited an analytical approach 
from two directions: values and motives on the one side and physical operations on the other. While agreeing that 
these analytical directions are valuable, for the study of transforming regulatory principle we consider what 
particular culturally motives and outcomes are key social indicators of the values which construct broad 
regulatory principle. 
Economy may better be viewed, as Polanyi does, within the parameters of physical operations and their outcomes, 
while the other social sphere, the religious/political, better informs motivations and values. This duality again is 
only instructive insofar as it can be integrated into a wider cultural understanding, but one in which economic 
determinism is no more, and perhaps less influential, than the whole. An inclusive view of man and society 
thereby enlightens and repositions economic ideas within a range of contesting values vying to shape overarching 
regulatory principle. 
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Notes 
 See the revival of interest in the moral base for socially responsible economics and the growing push for 
corporate social responsibility in the wake of recurrent international financial crises. More than this, and 
consistent with a strong sub-theme underpinning our analysis, is that the development of new social and 
economic paradigms complemented by social responsibility is inevitable within developed political 
economies (Korhonen, 2002). 
 A methodology to explore these considerations is to engage some of the literature examining South/Eastern 
regulatory initiatives (and further, fundamental principles of culturally located bonding), in order to challenge 
a monolithic construction of the regulatory state (weak, failed or otherwise). 
 Another indication of social dislocation is the contemporary emphasis in share valuation on speculative rather 
than productive profit expectation. Such qualifications, even if they may seem somewhat model, would make 
manageable the critical reflection on new ways of seeing mechanical purpose for global regulation. 
 In this paper, social embeddedness is employed as a critical tool to unlocking the analysis of regulation as a 
question of community/social bonding. The embeddedness of economic behavior refers to how economic 
transactions are embedded in the social relations within that society. The necessary implication is that 
economic activity is but one category of social activity, and therefore economic growth as the only measure 
for regulatory effectiveness cannot continue to persist. Through an interrogation of the principle of 
mechanical/organic solidarity which maintains social order, the organization of social life and social activity 
takes on a form and meaning that is law itself, or for our purposes, regulation. 
 The direction of this focus in what follows will be broadly on three types of literature: 
o Commentary and analysis on the regulatory state of the South. This is generally written by 
scholars who have a research familiarization with the South state, and these states are likely to be 
transitional and significant as an interface between the North and South regulatory worlds. 
o Commentary and analysis on regulatory projects in disaggregated states of the South. There is a 
preference here for writing from within that state, which is more likely to be focused on 
communitarian and collaborative strategies beyond the state. 
o Cultural studies literature which indicates other principles and motivations behind regulatory 
change, emanating from any of the major traditions of the South. This will be an eclectic and non-
discipline-specific literature. 
 This was the case for the telecommunications industry in India, where the court, in dealing with litigation 
concerning the constitutionality of privatization of telecom services, ruled that the legitimation of such an 
economic policy would depend on the presence of an independent regulatory authority to oversee such a 
policy endeavour. Following that decision, the Indian government moved to set up a regulatory authority (see 
Thiruvengadam and Joshi, 2012). 
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